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THE MERCHANT CLASS OF ARTICLE 2:
FARMERS, DOCTORS, AND OTHERS
JOHN F. DOLAN*
I.

INTRODUCTION

By the early nineteenth century Anglo-American jurists had incorpo-

rated the law merchant into the common law.' The civil law nations
of Europe preserved a separate code of commercial law applicable to
merchants, but English-speaking courts applied the same general system of commercial law to all persons and abandoned the practice of
applying different rules to different classes.2 The Uniform Commercial Code, however, created an exception to this general principle by
setting out special rules for a class which it designated "merchants.

3

* LL.B., University of Illinois, 1965; Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State
University.
1. In England the law merchant began in Medieval fairs and markets, where
merchants themselves served as judges. In the fourteenth century the common law
began to absorb the law merchant. See F. SANBORN, ORnINs oF Tim EARLY ENGLISH
MxRmmE AN COMMERCLAL LAW (1930).
The law merchant remained separate,
however, because merchants needed a body of law applicable in all nations, and a means
of obtaining quick and final resolution of disputes. See W. BEwns, THE ROMANCE OF
THE LAw MERCHANT 19 (1923); Rabel, The Sales Law in the Proposed Commercial
Code, 17 U. CIm L. REv. 427, 430-31 (1950). The law merchant still supplements
modem commercial law. See U.C.C. § 1-103.
2. C. BuNN, H. SNEAD, & R. SPEIDEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 38 (1964); 3 NEW YORK REPORT OF THE LAw REVISION COMMISSION
FOR 1955, STUDY OF TIE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 2165 (1955) [hereinafter cited
as N.Y. STUDY]; Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code,
63 HARv. L. REv. 561, 572-73 (1950).
3. Fifteen Code sections refer to "merchant": U.C.C. §§ 2-103(1) (b), 2-201(2),
2-205, 2-207(2), 2-209(2), 2-312(3), 2-314, 2-327(l)(c), 2-402(2), 2-403(2), 2-
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Courts find the merchant provisions troublesome. Decisions tend to
blur the merchant distinction or to ignore it altogether and generally
misunderstand the purpose of this distinction by class. Moreover, an
overly protective attitude by some courts toward certain favorites of the
law, and timidity at those times when the Code commands boldness,
contribute to the confusion.
This Article holds that the merchant rules impose a modest burden
on some individuals engaged in commercial activity; that the application
of the burden must abide a determination that such commercial activity
is involved; and that good sense and Code policy are best served by
extending the definition of "merchant," and its concomitant rules of
commercial activity, to a broad range of persons and situations. Courts
and commentators, because of an unspoken belief that the merchant's
burden is onerous, have generally adopted a different attitude from that
proposed here, and have defined the merchant class too narrowly.
11.

ThE CLASS

'Merchant' means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to
whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment
of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation
4
holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.

A merchant may be one of only two classes of persons: first, one
who "deals"; and second, one who "holds himself out," either by his
own occupation or by the employment of certain others. The definition reflects the Code's policy of meeting the reasonable expectations
of parties to a transaction. The Code assigns the burdens of the merchant rules according to objectively discernible facts out of which parties'
expectations may arise.
509(3), 2-603(1), 2-605(1)(b), 2-609(2), 7-210(2). U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b), which defines the "good faith" required of merchants, may apply to all of the sections in Article
2. All citations to code sections and comments, unless otherwise indicated, refer to the
Official Text of the 1972 version of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Official
Comments prepared by the sponsoring agencies.
4. U.C.C. § 2-104(1). This definition appears in Article 2 but should be applied
wherever the term is used. See U.C.C. § 7-210; note 74 infra. The definitions of
"good faith", see U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-103, may make the merchant definition applicable
to the entire Code. See note 54 infra.
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"Knowledge" or "skill" peculiar to practices or goods are the primary
indicators of the person who deals, as well as of the person who holds

himself out.6

The definition expressly requires these objective indicia

in the case of one who holds himself out, and implies the same require-

ment by using the term "otherwise" in the case of one who deals. There
is a secondary indicator in the terms "deals" and "occupation," which
requires that the activity subject to the definition be mercantile or busi-

ness-like, rather than recreational or personal.

This indicator is less

strongly connoted by the term "deals" than by the term "occupation."

Authorities enlarge on the definition by contrasting a "merchant"
with a housewife, 6 a householder," "mere" lawyers,8 a yeoman farmer, 9

a school teacher,' 0 casual sellers,'1 and "ordinary" persons,' 2 and by
characterizing the merchant above all as a "professional.""3 The merchant definition therefore acknowledges reasonable commercial expec-

tations.

It encompasses a person involved in a business transaction

who holds himself out to others (by dealing, by occupation, or by em-

ploying certain others) as having knowledge or skill as to certain practices or goods.

As the following analysis of the merchant sections suggests, some
Code sections are "practice" oriented, others are "goods" oriented, and
some are mixed.' 4 Most of the controversy, however, centers on one
5. Professor Nordstrom argues that "knowledge" and "skill" refer only to the
person who "holds himself out." See R. No Smom, LAW OF SALEs 408 n.25 (1970).
Although grammatical precision supports that argument, it does not negate the strong
implication of the term "otherwise" that the word "deals" connotes similar "knowledge"
or "skill." See U.C.C. § 2-104(1).
6. See 1 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORm COMMERCAL
CODE 70 (1964); 1 NEw YORK REPORT OF THE LAW REvISION COMMISSION FOR 1954,
HEARINGS ON Tm UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 108 (1954) (testimony of K. Llewellyn) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. HEAMNGS]; R. NoRDsTRoM, supra note 5, at 204.
7. 1 N.Y. HEARiNGs, supra note 6, at 125 (testimony of K. Llewellyn).
8. Id. at 108.
9. Id. at 108, 125. But see Iowa Code Ann. § 554.2403 (West 1967) and Iowa
Comment (adopting U.C.C. § 2-403). See also Rabel, supra note 1, at 431.
10. See Williston, supra note 2, at 573.
11. See C. BUNN, H. SNEAD, & R. SPEiDEL, supra note 2, at 37.
12. See 1 N.Y. HEARINos, supra note 6, at 122 (testimony of K. Llewellyn).
13. See U.C.C. § 2-104, Comment 1; 1 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, at 11; Kripke,
The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL.
L.F. 321, 324.
14. See U.C.C. § 2-104 (Comment 2 classifies U.C.C. §§ 2-201(2), 2-205, 2-207,
and 2-209 as "practice" sections, U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-402(2), and 2-403(2) as "goods"
sections and the balance as applicable to either kind of merchant).
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6
"practice" section 15 and one "goods" section.'

I. Tim FRAMEwoRK
Many authorities have objected to the merchant definition. 7 Critics
of the Code have pointed out the lack of consistency in the terminology
of the merchant sections,' 8 the novel use of conventional terms,', and
the resulting vagueness of the boundaries of the class of merchants, and
have expressed a distaste for the class or status notion of the definition.2 0

Fears prompted by these weaknesses yielded some ad terrorem arguments. 2 The complaints are generally well founded; the fears are not.
The lack of consistency in terminology is evident in the "goods" sections212

which variously refer to merchants "with respect to goods of that
a merchant "regularly dealing in goods of the kind"; 24 a "merchant-seller"; 25 and a merchant "who deals in goods of that kind. 20
kind"; 23

15. U.C.C. § 2-201; see notes 90-117 infra and accompanying text.
16. U.C.C. § 2-314; see notes 172-94 infra and accompanying text.
17. See Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code as a Problem in Codification, 16 LAw & CONTEMp. PROB. 141, 145-46 (1951); Duesenberg & King, Sales & Bulk
Transfers, 3 BENDER'S U.C.C. SERV. § 2.0412], at 2-64 (1974); Williston, supra note 2,
at 572-73. See generally Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 798 (1958); Newell, The Merchant of Article 2, 7 VAL. U.L
REV. 307 (1973).
18. See notes 23-26 infra and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Waite, The Proposed New Uniform Sales Act, 48 MICH. L. REv. 603
(1950).
20. See 1 N.Y. HEARwGS, supra note 6, at 93-94. See generally Hall, Article 2Sales-"From Status to Contract," 1952 WIs. L. REV. 209; Mellinkoff, The Language of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 185 (1967); Rabel, supra note 1, at 43033; 17 U. Cm. L. REV. 427 (1950). Contra, Braucher, McCurdy, Sutherland, & Kaplan,
Report on Article 2-Sales by Certain Members of Faculty of Harvard Law School
(Spring 1950 Draft and September 1950 Revisions), 6 Bus. LAw. 151, 154 (1951).
21. Some commentators were concerned that a farmer might be a merchant for
purposes of the risk-of-loss provision of U.C.C. § 2-509(3). See 1 N.Y. STUDY, supra
note 2, at 489-90; Hall, supra note 20, at 212. See generally Newell, supra note 17.
22. The warranty provisions and the fraudulent-retention and entrusting provisions
are "goods" sections, see note 14 supra, and apply only to merchants whom, the drafters
felt, buyers would believe to be familiar with certain goods. See U.C.C. §§ 2-312(3), 2314(2), 2-402(2), 2-403(2). The fine-print sections discussed in this article are clearly
"practice" sections. See notes 85-89 infra and accompanying text. The remaining
merchant provisions apply both to those familiar with "practices" and to those familiar
with "goods."
23. U.C.C. § 2-314.
24. U.C.C. § 2-312(3).
25. U.C.C. § 2-402(2).
26. U.C.C. § 2-403(2).
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The four different phrases suggest that each section refers to a different
type of merchant.
The critics complained further that the reference
in the definition of the term "between merchants"2 s to parties "chargeable
with the knowledge or skill of merchants"2' implies a category of parties
different from merchants. 0 The courts have not been disturbed by
these deficiencies in draftsmanship, however.
More accurate were the critics' predictions that the drafters' selection
of the frequently used term "merchant" for special meaning would
create difficulties. In fact, it has; but the blame for these problems
may rest on the shoulders of the courts and their advocates, who have
apparently ignored the definitional section. It is one thing to give
special meaning to a common term, as the Code drafters did; it is
another to quote Words and Phrases"' or the American Heritage Dictionary" ' or refer to the law merchante 3 in determining the applicability
of the merchant rules to litigated facts, when the Code itself provides
a definition. The problem is not so much careless drafting as it is careless legal analysis.
By and large the courts have avoided the extreme results the critics
feared, but they have done so in part at the expense of the underlying
reasons of the merchant provisions. Rather than expanding the merchant definition beyond the limits of fairness, as these critics feared,
courts have contracted it to the point of depriving commerce of the full
benefit the merchant sections are designed to provide.
The fears of the critics, moreover, were based on the notion that a
person who was a merchant for one "practice" section would be a
27. They also suggest that a person who is a merchant for one of the "goods"
sections is not necessarily a merchant for purposes of the others. See text at notes 19094 infra.
28. U.C.C. § 2-104(3).
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30.

NEw YORK REPORT OF THE LA-w REVISION COMISSION FOR 1956, REPORT AND

APPENDICES RELXTrNG TO THE UNIFORM COMiMERCIAL CODE 366 (1956).
31. See Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, 239 Ark. 962, 964, 395 S.W.2d 555, 556 (1965).
32. See Lish v. Compton,

-

Uiah 2d -,

-

n.3, 547 P.2d 223, 226 n.3 (1976).

See also Sand Seed Service, Inc. v.Poeckes, 249 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Iowa 1977), where
the court used BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY and RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY.

33. See U.C.C. § 2-104, Comment 2: "'merchant' as defined here roots in the 'law
merchant' concept of a professional in business" (emphasis added). The Cook Grains
court mistakenly read that language to mean that the term "merchant" is to be defined
by the usage of this word in the law merchant. The Comment means only that the Code
borrowed the concept of a professional in business from the law merchant to define the
Code's orn specialized term.
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merchant for all "practice" sections, since there was no language in
the sections to suggest the contrary. Nor was there anything in the Code
to dispel the idea that a merchant under one of the "goods" sections
would be a merchant for the "practice" sections.8 4 Logic, however,
does not compel the once-a-merchant, always-a-merchant rule. Despite
the fact that there is only one definition of merchant, that definition
is open-ended; and its openness and vagueness may well be its strength,
by permitting courts to fashion the rule with the flexibility necessary
to serve the reason of the merchant sections, which are independent
in and of themselves.8 5 Review of the cases reveals that trouble arises
when courts ignore the underlying reason of a particular section and
look to the definitional section as a kind of polestar, fixed outside the
realm of commerce.
IV.
A.

THE BURDEN

Risk of Loss

Commenting on the rule that the Code is to be construed liberally
and in accordance with its purposes, 6 the drafters remark that each
section must be "limited to its reason. 3s7 This comment, which Professor Skilton calls the most important in the Code, 8 clearly requires
that the single, general definition of merchant be applied in accordance
with the varying reasons of the sections which employ the term. An
analysis of the risk-of-loss section shows how important these fundamental guides to construction can be.
The Code's basic risk-of-loss provision" contains a special rule for
merchants that requires them to bear the risk of loss even after tender
(after the merchant gives the buyer any notice reasonably necessary and
34. See U.C.C. § 2-104, Comment 2; Kripke, supra note 13, at 325-26; Newell,
supra note 17.
35. There is no necessary relation, for example, between the duty to dispose of
rejected goods and the risk-of-loss provision. One puts risk on the buyer, the other on
the seller. The "goods" sections invariably use different language from the "practices"
sections in designating a merchant. See notes 23-26 supra.
36. See U.C.C. § 1-102(1).
37. V.C.C. § 1-102, Comment 1.
38. Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code,
1966 Wis. L. Rav. 597, 609.
39. U.C.C. § 2-509(3). Tender of delivery does not require receipt by the buyer.
U.C.C. § 2-503(1). See, e.g., Caudle v. Sherrard Motor Co., 525 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1975).
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holds conforming goods at the buyer's disposition) .40 Tender by a nonmerchant passes risk to the buyer. The Code drafters explain this different treatment by stating that the merchant "can be expected to insure his interests in [the goods].

' 41

It should follow from this reason

that sellers who cannot be expected to insure the goods they hold for
buyers should therefore not be considered merchants in this context.
Critics of the Code,4 2 overlooking section 1-102 and its comments, saw
the special risk-of-loss provision as an ill-advised attempt to reverse
Tarling v. Baxter, a farm case in which the court held that the risk of
loss does not pass to the buyer on tender but on delivery. 48
During the New York Law Revision Commission's consideration of the
Code, the Commerce and Industry Association's Task Group questioned the advisability of such a change.4 4 Professor Llewellyn,
official reporter for the Code and chief draftsman of Article 2, responded in a fashion that reflects his regard for the command of section
1-102 and its comment that the application of any section be limited
to its reason.
I should have some hope that a court, seeing the reason for the rule
announced in the comment [that merchants can be expected to insure
the goods45],and knowing that farmers are not within that reason,
might arrive at the conclusion that for this purpose the farmer who is

so worrying the majority of the Commerce and Industry Association's
Task Group would not be a merchant: cessante ratione, cessat ipsa
lex.4 6

Professor Llewellyn did not ponder whether farmers generally were
or were not merchants, but asked the question: What conclusion does
the reason of the section support? His statement clearly presupposes,
moreover, that a person may be a merchant for some sections but not
for others :4 all sections must be limited by their reasons. 8 The policy
40. U.C.C. § 2-503(1).
41. U.C.C. § 2-509, Comment 3.
42. See Hall, supra note 20, at 221; Waite, supra note 19, at 618; Williston, supra
note 2, at 572.
43. 6 B. & C. 360, 108 Eng. Rep. 484 (K.B. 1827) (sale of hay by farmer).
44. The Commission itself also questioned the advisability of such a change. See 1
N.Y. STuDY, supra note 2, at 489-90.
45. U.C.C. § 2-509, Comment 3.
46. 1 N.Y. HEAR Gs, supra note 6, at 124 (emphasis in original).
47. "tFlor this purpose the farmer . . . would not be a merchant ....
"
Id.
(emphasis in original).
48. See U.C.C. § 1-102, Comment 1.
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and good sense of section 1-102 is further served by expanding each
section in accord with the legislature's command to construe provisions liberally to serve their reasons. The varying purposes of the
sections therefore delimit the application of each by restricting courts
from applying any section beyond its reason and by commanding courts
to extend the section in accordance with that reason.
The sections comprising the burden that the Code imposes on the
merchant class fall into five categories: risk of loss, good faith, rights
of third persons, fine print, and warranties. Risk of loss has already
been discussed; analysis of remaining sections is necessary for complete
understanding of the term "merchant."
B.

Good-FaithProvisions

Article 2 contains both subjective and objective standards of good
faith,49 and imposes the latter upon merchants.5 0 The Code directs
that "good faith" attend the performance or enforcement of any contract or duty within the Code,"' and commercial lawyers may therefore
argue that the good faith required of merchants in all instances must
rise to the rigorous objective standard. The Official Comments support
that argument. 52 Those familiar with the Code's early drafts contest
that conclusion,5" and the question remains unresolved. 4 Whether
objective good faith is always required, several sections of Article
2 expressly impose that standard and several others impose it indirectly.
The requirements contract section, 5 and the open-price term"0 and
49. See generally Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 666 (1963).
50. "'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." U.C.C. §

2-103(1) (b).
51. U.C.C. § 1-203.
52. See U.C.C. §§ 2-209, Comment 2; 2-607, Comment 4; 2-609, Comment 6; 2612, Comments 3 & 7.
53. See Farnsworth, supra note 49, at 676; Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. Rv.
195, 212-13 (1968).
54. See, e.g., Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648 (Del. 1972).
Contra, National Car Rental v. Fox, 18 Ariz. App. 160, 500 P.2d 1148 (1972); see
Couch v. Cockroft, 490 S.W.2d 713 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972). See generally Skilton,
Buyer in Ordinary Course of Business Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(and Related Matters), 1974 WIs. L. Rnv. 1, 25-27.

55. U.C.C. § 2-306(1).
56. U.C.C. § 2-305(2).
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open-terms-of-performance provisions, 57 contain express requirements
of good faith that for merchants is measured objectively. 5 A number
of other sections, without using the term "good faith," require such a

standard of conduct from merchants.

For example, two sections re-

quire merchant buyers to follow a seller's directions to sell goods in the

merchant's possession. 9 Such directions must be carried out in
faith."' The Code's definition of "buyer in ordinary course of
ness" imposes a good faith standard, 6 ' and merchants who fall
of objective good faith lose the free-market protection afforded
62

by certain other Code provisions.
The burden imposed by these good-faith sections varies.

good
busishort
them

A mer-

chant may have to expend considerable effort to dispose of perishable
commodities,0

3

but the obligation to specify defects is minimal. 64 The

Code assumes that merchants as a class are capable of complying with
even the more burdensome good-faith requirements.

Courts should be

aware of this assumption when deciding whether a person is a merchant
under a section imposing good-faith obligations. The ability to carry
out the good-faith requirement of a section does not, of course, make
one a merchant; the reason of the section must still be consulted.
Furthermore, the good-faith requirements themselves are limited to

what is reasonable.

A merchant buyer's duty to dispose of rejected

57. U.C.C. § 2-311(1).
58. See Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir.
1974); Columbus Milk Producers' Coop. v. Department of Agriculture, 48 Wis. 2d 451,
180 N.W.2d 617 (1970). See also § 2-305, Comment 3.
59. U.C.C. §§ 2-327(l)(c), 2-603.
60. See Gutor Int'l AG v. Raymond Packer Co., 493 F.2d 938 (1st Cir. 1974);
Arkin Imports, Inc. v. Dorothy's Exclusive Fashions, Inc., 12 UCC RP. SERV. 871 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. 1973); cf. Mitchell Rubber Products, Inc. v. Hub Auto Supply, Inc., 28 Mass.
App. Dec. 109 (1964) (buyer held duty-bound to sell goods in excess of order even
though no instructions).
61. U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
62. See generally Skilton, supra note 54.
63. In Traynor v. Walters, 342 F. Supp. 455 (M.D. Pa. 1972), a New York City
florist was required to dispose of Christmas trees which he received from a Pennsylvania
seller but which were not satisfactory for his purposes. In Gutor Int'l AG v. Raymond
Packer Co., 493 F.2d 938 (1st Cir. 1974), the court penalized a dealer for failing to
dispose of dictating equipment received from a foreign seller. In Arkin Imports, Inc. v.
Dorothy's Exclusive Fashions, Inc., 12 UCC REP. SERv. 871 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973),
however, the court did not require a retailer of non-conforming shirts to dispose of them,
because the seller-manufacturer was located within the same market and the goods were
not perishable.
64. A non-merchant may not arbitrarily refuse to provide such a list and thereby
deprive the seller of the opportunity to cure defects. U.C.C. § 2-605(1).
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goods includes the duty to follow only the seller's reasonable instructions or to make reasonable efforts."' A merchant's duty to provide
another merchant with adequate assurance of performance is limited
to what is "reasonable" according to "commercial standards,"08 and the
general good-faith definition requires only what is "reasonable" in the
merchant's own trade.0 7 These features of the good-faith provisions
eliminate the harshness which would attend the application of an objective standard of fairness unconnected with commercial reality. The
Code expects a merchant to do only what other similarly situated merchants of that trade or profession would do; courts and juries are not
to make unfair demands.
Thus, even though a grocer is a merchant, he would not be bound
to sell a defective furnace under the rejected goods section, because
it would be unreasonable to impose that burden on him; the rejected
goods section requires only reasonable efforts.68 Similarly, although a
college professor familiar with trade practices may, in a commercial endeavor, be a merchant, the Code tempers the professor's duties with
the ubiquitous reasonableness modifier. Finally, if farmers and doctors
are merchants, as this paper suggests they are in most instances, the
Code measures their duties as merchants not against bankers or jobbers
or factors but against other farmers and other doctors. 9
C. Rights of Third Persons
The Code states three special rules for creditors of merchants. First,
a merchant's creditor cannot complain that he was fraudulently misled
into extending credit by the merchant's retention, under certain circumstances, of goods already sold.70 Second, a person who entrusts goods
65. See U.C.C. § 2-603, Comment 2; accord,U.C.C. § 2-327(1) (c).
66. U.C.C. § 2-609(2).
67. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b).
68. Professor Hawkland avoids the problem by saying that a grocer is only a
merchant with respect to groceries and not to furnaces. 1 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, at
238-39. That solution has the unfortunate effect of permitting the grocer to avoid the
"practice" sections in corresponding with the manufacturer concerning that furnace.
69. Any other conclusion ignores the notion of "commercial standards," U.C.C. §§
2-103(1)(b), 2-609(2), and "dealing in the trade," U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b), which must
relate to a "trade" or branch of commerce in which the "merchant" is engaged.
70. U.C.C. § 2-402(2). Professor Warren expresses relief that this rule sheds the
influence of "the hoary doctrine of fraudulent conveyance law." Warren, Cutting Off
Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 469,
474 (1963).
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to a merchant dealing in goods of that kind gives the merchant power
to transfer all of the entruster's rights to a buyer in ordinary course
of business. 71 Third, a warehouseman who stores a merchant's goods
enjoys a wider range of choice in disposing of those goods upon the
merchant's failure to pay storage charges than he would if the bailor
were a nonmerchant. 71 The first two provisions apply to merchant
sellers and demonstrate the Code's willingness to frame rules which reflect the expectations of the parties. The fraudulent-retention section
assumes lenders know that many merchants make delivery after the
time of sale. The entrusting section reflects the expectation of a
buyer that he will take free and clear from a dealer in ordinary
course of business. 73 The warehouseman section is not part of Article
2 but uses the term "merchant" and should be subject to the Article
2 definition. 74 This section displays the Code's assumption that business debtors in commercial dealings do not require all of the procedural
safeguards extended to others.7"
The fraudulent-retention and entrusting sections are neutral insofar
as the merchants themselves are concerned. Any tendency the sections have to inhibit credit is offset by their tendency to facilitate sales.
These sections burden not merchants but third parties dealing with
merchants. The warehouseman section is something of a burden to
the merchant himself, but the burden is modest.
The problems with determining the scope of the merchant definition
as applied in these sections center on the farmer. Investors often acquire cattle and entrust them to a farmer for fattening or grazing purposes. 7 6 If a farmer sells his own cattle in various markets he may
71. U.C.C. § 2-403(2).
72. U.C.C. § 7-210.
73. The Code defines "buyer in ordinary course of business" in U.C.C. § 1-201(9)
and includes "good faith" as an element of that definition, a fact which may have significance for a "merchant" who desires the protection extended to the buyer in ordinary
course.

74. See generally First National Bank v. Crone, 157 Ind. App. 665, 301 N.E.2d 378
Professor
(1973); Mattek v. Malofsky, 42 Wis.2d 16, 165 N.W.2d 406 (1969).
Hawkland argues: "[Alithough the word 'merchant' has been used perhaps inadvertently outside of Article 2, clearly its Article 2 definition should be universally controlling."
Hawkland, Some Uses and Misuses of a Verbal Concordance to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 5. Contra, C. BVNN, H. SNEAD, & R. SPEIDEL, supra note
2, at 38; cf. Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648 (Del. 1972) (Article 2
good-faith does not apply to secured transaction).
75. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-505(1) and 9-507(1).
76. See IowA CODE ANN. § 554.1201 (37) (West 1967), Iowa Comment 37.
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be a "merchant who deals in goods of that kind"; his unauthorized sale
of the investors' cattle will then clothe the buyer in ordinary course with
good title. 77 The same result obtains if farmer A gives his farm products to a neighbor, farmer B, for delivery for the account of A. If
B, without authorization, sells A's goods and pockets the proceeds,
the buyer will prevail over A.78 One state settles the problem with
a non-conforming amendment to the Code79 and another by applying
80
its Livestock Brand and Anti-Theft Act.
Where special statutory solutions are not available, two policies
govern these cases. The first is the fundamental policy, expressed in
the Code,81 that a buyer in an open market takes his purchase free of
any claims against the seller.8 2 The second policy is the Code's general
acceptance of the reasonable expectations of parties to a business transaction; one who entrusts his goods to another does not expect his goods
to be sold in a way that defeats the owner's title.8 3 The policies, of
course, compete.
Cases in which there are competing claims for goods entrusted to
farmers and sold by them can be resolved by deciding first whether
the farmer in the case is a "merchant," and then applying the entrusting
section in accord with this general determination. This approach ignores the underlying policy issues and is, in any case, incorrect. A farmer
may be a "merchant" and yet not a "merchant who deals in goods
of that kind." A far better approach would be to determine whether
the farmer is a "merchant who deals," within the meaning of the section, by consulting its reason. That reason, of course, includes the policy of fostering a free market by satisfying the expectations of buyers
in ordinary course of business that they are getting good title, 84
77. U.C.C. § 2-403(2).
78. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.2503 (West 1967), Iowa Comments at 428.
79. IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.2403 (West 1967).
80. See Pugh v. Stratton, 22 Utah 2d 190, 450 P.2d 463 (1969).
81. See U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (excluding farmers selling farm products from the
market overt rule); cf. U.C.C. § 7-503, Comment 1 (title of a purchaser by due
negotiation prevails over almost any prior interest if his possession derived from action
by prior claimant which introduced goods into stream of commerce).
82. "[it is expedient that the buyer, by taking proper precautions, may at all events
be secure of his purchase; otherwise all commerce between man and man must soon be at
an end." 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *449.
83. See, e.g., 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAIES *450-51 (statutes provided an exception to the rule of market overt when the goods consisted of a stolen horse).
84. This argument recognizes that the reason of U.C.C. § 2-403, as expressed in
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while giving due regard to the expectations of those persons entrusting
their goods to farmers. Courts should balance these competing interests when deciding whether to apply this merchant rule to farmers. To
consider the farmer alone weights the scale on only one side of the
fulcrum.
D. Fine PrintSections
Four Code provisions assume that merchants read contract documents more carefully than nonmerchants. The first provision, 5 a
source of considerable controversy in this context, deprives a merchant
of the Statute of Frauds defense if he receives, under certain conditions,
a written confirmation and fails to reject it within ten days. The second
provision 6 imposes on a merchant, under certain circumstances, additional terms in an acceptance or confirmation, so long as those terms
do not materially alter the original agreement. The third section s" protects only nonmerchants against a nomnodification provision. The
fourth provision 8 denies merchants a lack-of-consideration defense if
a firm offer is in writing and otherwise meets the section's requirements.
These sections relieve fast-moving commercial transactions from
some of the formalities of common law contract principles. Their
burden consists of requiring the merchant to read contract documents
with care and to object to terms with which he disagrees. The most
significant of these sections is that relating to the Statute of Frauds.
This provision avoids the unfairness of letting one party use the Statute
of Frauds defense while denying it to the other party." It gives rise
to frequent litigation of the issue of whether a farmer is to be classed
as a merchant.
Comment 2, turns on the function of "inventory," and further recognizes that agricultural products are usually not inventory. See U.C.C. § 9-109(3).
85. U.C.C. § 2-201(2).
86. U.C.C. § 2-207(2).

87. U.C.C. § 2-209(2).
88. U.C.C. § 2-205.

89. Mhe Code adds a purpose which the case4aw now established has long
forgotten: the Code adds both the desire and a reasonable machinery for a
businessman to be able to rely on what both parties sign and on the fact that
he has procured a memorandum signed by the other party.
I N.Y. HEMUNGS, supra note 6, at 109 (testimony of K. Llewellyn) (emphasis in
original). Professor Nordstrom notes a hiatus in the application of the provision and a
resulting frustration of that policy. The policy, however limited, nonetheless remains.
See R. No~amom, supra note 5, at 60 n.31.
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FARMER

FarmersAs Merchants

Farmers occasionally assert a Statute of Frauds defense denied to
merchants who fail to reject a confirming memorandum within ten
days. 90 The first and leading case, Cook Grains,Inc. v. Fallis,1 got the
courts off quickly and decisively on the wrong foot. The court in Cook
Grains assumed that since the plaintiff grain company had sent a confirming memorandum, the defendant farmer would be liable if the
court found him to be a merchant. 2 That assumption was incorrect.
The statute did not make the recipient of the memorandum liable. It
only deprived him of the Statute of Frauds defense, leaving the grain
company with the obligation of proving there was a contract in the first
instance to "confirm." The Cook Grains court, therefore, perceived
a greater burden on merchants under the Code than it in fact imposed.
More dismaying was the court's analysis of the merchant definition.
Adopting a conventional view of the term "merchant," it concluded that
the merchant rules applied only to "professional traders.""" The court
relied on pre-Code cases that necessarily defined "merchant" without
reference to the Code's definition; the court said that in "construing
a statute its words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning." '
In short, the opinion fell into the trap so many of the Code's critics
envisioned. It gave conventional meaning to the word "merchant"
which the Code uses unconventionally. In doing so the court ignored
the underlying reason of the Statute of Frauds, the merchant definition
sections, and the legislative command that courts construe the Code's
provisions liberally.
Although the Cook Grains case prompted some criticism, 8 it
90. U.C.C. § 2-201(2).
91. 239 Ark. 962, 395 S.W.2d 555 (1965).
92. "Thus, it will be seen that under the statute, if appellee is a merchant he would
be liable under the alleged contract because he did not, within ten days, give written
notice that he rejected it." Id. at 963, 395 S.W.2d at 556. The mistake is not an
uncommon one. See Loeb & Co. v. Schreiner, 294 Ala. 722, 321 So.2d 199 (1975);
Campanelli v. Conservas Altamira, S.A., 86 Nev. 838, 477 P.2d 870 (1970); cf. Nelson
v. Union Equity Coop. Exch., 536 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976) (written confirmation of sale by merchant wheat seller).
93. Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, 239 Ark. 962, 965, 395 S.W.2d 555, 557 (1965).
94. Id.
95. See 1 R. ANDtsoN, ArDERSON'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-104:6, at
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spawned a vigorous line of authority. The Alabama Supreme Court,
repeating the same incorrect assumption that the Statute of Frauds
makes the defendant liable when he is denied its defenses, ruled in
Loeb & Co. v. Schreiner,9" that a cotton farmer was not a "professional
cotton merchant,"97 stressing the fact that the defendant farmer sold
only his own produce and not that of others. The Kansas Supreme
Court98 concluded that a defendant farmer who sold his own wheat was
knowledgeable or skilled in raising that wheat, but not in selling it, and
therefore was not a merchant. 9 The Supreme Court of Utah, relying
in part on The American Heritage Dictionary's definition of "merchant," held that because a farmer sells crops only once a year he is
not a merchant who, by definition, must sell more frequently. 100 Finally, the Supreme Court of Iowa 01° recently opted for the Cook
Grains, Inc. position stressing the conventional meaning of the term
"merchant." It concluded that a farmer is not a merchant when he
sells his own grain.
Two other state supreme courts decided cases within the scope of
the Article 2 Statute of Frauds rule but did not apply the Code at all.
Montana declined to apply the Statute of Frauds provision even though
the court acknowledged that, but for the merchant question, which the
court did not decide, that section would apply. 10 2 In a South Dakota
case, 0 3 the defendant pleaded the Statute of Frauds defense, but the
court avoided the issue by holding the defendant liable on principles
of equitable estoppel. 104
These opinions demonstrate the courts' marked reluctance to bring
agricultural commerce within the shadow of the Codes merchant rule
221 (2d ed. 1970); Duesenberg & King, supra note 17, § 2.04[2] at 2-65 (1965); 65
MICH. L. REv. 345 (1966).
96. 294 Ala. 722, 321 So. 2d 199 (1975).
97. Id. at 725, 321 So.2d at 202.
98. Decatur Coop. Ass'n v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 547 P.2d 323 (1916).
99. Id. at 177, 547 P.2d at 328. Accord, Sierens v. Clausen, 21 Ill.
App. 3d 450,
315 N.E.2d 897 (1974), rev'd, 60 Ill.
2d 585, 328 N.E.2d 559 (1975); Sand Seed Serv.,
Inc. v. Poekes, 249 N.W.2d 663 (Iowa 1977).
100. Lish v. Compton, - Utah 2d -, 547 P.2d 223 (1976).
101. Sand Seed Serv., Inc. v. Poeckes, 249 N.W.2d 663 (Iowa 1977).
102. Cargill, Inc. v. Wilson, 166 Mont. 346, 532 P.2d 988 (1975).
103. Farmers Elev. Co. v. Lyle, - S.D. -, 238 N.W.2d 290 (1976).
104. See also Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chemical Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207
(8th Cir. 1976); Jamestown Terminal Elevator, Inc. v. Hieb, 246 N.W.2d 736 (N.D.
1976). But see Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. Cole, 239 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1976) (refusing
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and may reflect doubts that farmers can cope with the burden that
the Code imposes upon merchants, a burden that is lighter in fact than
the courts in Loeb and Cook Grainsassumed it to be.
There is a second line of authority that rejects Cook Grains and its
progeny. In Campbell v. Yokel,' 05 an Illinois court concluded that
"farmer" and "merchant" were not mutually exclusive terms and that
a farmer "may be considered a merchant in some instances and that
one of those instances exists when the farmer is a person 'who deals
in goods of a kind . . . involved in the transaction.' "100

The court

found that a farmer who "regularly sells his crops is a person who 'deals
in goods of that kind.' ",107 Campbell avoided the Cook Grains error
of giving "merchant" a conventional construction. The Campbell
opinion also examined the underlying reason of the merchant exception
to the Statute of Frauds rule. The provision covers instances in which
a buyer sends a written confirmation. The buyer cannot use the Statute
of Frauds; and it is unfair, the authorities agree, to let a merchant receiving such confirmation hold it, waiting to see what happens to the
price until the date of delivery, and then back out of his bargain if the
price goes up. 0L The Campbell opinion, to prevent that unfairness,
denied the Statute of Frauds defense to a farmer who had grown and
sold grain to grain companies for several years. The Illinois Supreme
Court adopted the Campbell reasoning, 109 saying, "[w]e know of no
reason why under the circumstances shown here the defendant, admittedly a farmer, cannot at the time of the sale be a 'merchant.' "110
To the same effect are Continental Grain Co. v.Harbachl" and
Currituck Grain, Inc. v. Powell." 2 In Harbach,the farmer argued that
he had sold some grains for many years but had sold soybeans, the subto invoke estoppel). This case sidesteps the merchant issue by finding that the seller
failed to allege that the farmer was a merchant. See also Farmland Serv. Coop., Inc. v.
Klein, 196 Neb. 538, 244 N.W.2d 86 (1976).
105. 20 Ill. App. 3d 702, 313 N.E.2d 628 (1974). (Wags will be pleased to learn
that Yokel was the farmer.).
106. Id. at 705, 313 N.E.2d at 630 (emphasis added).
107. Id.
108. See note 117 infra.
2d 585, 328 N.E.2d 559 (1975) (farmer for 34 years
109. Sierens v. Clausen, 60 Ill.
had sold grain for present or future delivery for the past five years).
110. Id. at 589, 328 N.E.2d at 561.
111. 400 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. I1.1975).
112. 28 N.C. App. 563, 222 S.E.2d 1 (1976).
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ject of the litigated sale, for only a few months. The court was unimpressed with this distinction. Currituck expresses a rationale implicit
in other cases: "[the growing and marketing of corn and soybeans is
an important part of the agricultural economy of this area. The procedures for marketing crops are well known."' 11
Other recent cases
support this view and consider the merchant's status to be a question

of fact. 1 4 In short, these courts recognize grain farming and marketing as a business enterprise which should be subject to the rules
established for commercial activity. The unfairness of doing otherwise
is clear. In these cases the farmer-seller and a grain company confer
orally about a sale. The company then confirms its purchase in writing
and the farmer does nothing while the price goes up. In Loeb the
5
price of cotton went from thirty-seven cents to "the middle 80 cents";"

the price of wheat in another case went from $2.86 to $3.46 per
bushel;"" in a third case there was only an increase from $3.30 to
$3.45.117

Other cases involving farmers arise from warranty disputes. In these
cases there has been little discussion of the merchant question, and the

determination has been treated as one of fact. In Fear Ranches, Inc.
v.Berry,1 8 the court concluded that a single sale of livestock by a
rancher to another rancher (even though the seller had previously sold
to packers) did not render the seller a merchant with respect 9to goods
120
1
of that kind. In other cases courts found sellers of calves, " hay,
and sod' 21 to be merchants subject to the warranty provisions. Courts

113. 28 N.C. App. 563, 566, 222 S.E.2d 1,3 (1976).
114. See Continental Grain Co. v. Martin, 536 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1976); Ohio Grain
Co. v. Swisshelm, 40 Ohio App. 2d 203, 318 N.E.2d 428 (1973); Nelson v. Union
Equity Coop. Exch., 536 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Ct.App. 1976).
115. Loeb & Co. v. Schreiner, 294 Ala. 722, 723, 321 So. 2d 199, 200 (1975).
116. Decatur Coop. Ass'n v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 547 P.2d 323 (1976).
117. Rising farm commodity prices have yielded a number of cases in which farmersellers have sought to avoid a bad bargain. See Bradford v. Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n,
539 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1976); R.N. Kelly Cotton Merchant, Inc. v. York, 494 F.2d 41
(5th Cir. 1974); Cone Mills Corp. v. A.G. Estes, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ga.
1974); Cox v. Cox, 292 Ala. 106, 289 So.2d 609 (1974). In Harris v. Hine, 232 Ga.
183, 205 S.E.2d 847 (1974), the price of cotton rose from 30 to 70 cents per pound,
increasing the value of the cotton sold by $140,000. See generally 53 N.C.L. REV. 579
(1975).
118. 470 F.2d 905 (l0th Cir. 1972).
119. Martineau v. Walker, 97 Idaho 246, 542 P.2d 1165 (1975).
120. Azevedo v. Minister, 86 Nev. 576, 471 P.2d 661 (1970).
121. Barron v. Edwards, 45 Mich. App. 210, 206 N.W.2d 508 (1973).
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do not hesitate to find farmer cooperatives are merchants for the purpose of the warranty provision. 2
B.

The Myth

Courts that refuse to accord merchant status to farmers may well be
misled by the myth of the American farmer. The notion appears in
the assumption that "farmer" and "merchant" are mutually exclusive
terms. 23 The myth of the farmer who has nothing to do with the commerce of the cities has a long history. Thomas Jefferson said that
"those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God ....
Many political figures have exploited romantic notions of bucolic sim26
plicity and urban evil.' 25 In part as a result of this farmer myth,'
state legislatures and Congress have enacted many statutes for the protection of farmers. The Uniform Commercial Code recognizes that
body of legislation by stating that Article 2 does not implicitly repeal
regulation of sales to farmers. 27 Other statutes protect the family farm
by regulating corporation farming, 2 extending consumer protection to
farmers, 129 providing less restrictive tax records requirements for
122. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App.
31, 286 N.E.2d 118 (1972).
123. "The evidence in this case is that appellee is a farmer and nothing else. He
farms about 550 acres and there is no showing that he has any other occupation." Cook
Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, 239 Ark. 962, 964, 395 S.W.2d 555, 556 (1965).
124. 2 Tim WRITINGS OF THOMAs JEFFERSON 229 (Mem. ed. 1907). "We have heard
a lot, ever since our country was young, about the beneficial effects upon young men and
women growing up close to nature and good, honest work. And it isn't a myth either."
Hearings on the Effect of Corporate Farming on Small Business Before the Subcomm.
on Monopoly of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 113
(1968) (statement of Msgr. J.Weber) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. See
generally R. HOFSTADTER, TIm AGE OF REFORM (1955).
125. "Bum down your cities and leave our farms, and your cities will spring up again
as if by magic; but destroy our farms and the grass will grow in the streets of every city
in the country." W.J. BRYAN, TAE Fmsr BArr
205 (1896). "The mobs of great cities
add just so much to the support of pure government as sores do to the strength of the
human body." 2 ThE WrInTNGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 124, at 230.
126. Effective farm lobbying has played a role as well. SeF E. HIOBEE, FARMS AND
FARMERS IN AN URBAN AGE 118 (1963).
127. U.C.C. § 2-102.
128. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2701 (1964); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 500.24 (West
1976); N.D. CENr. CODE § 10-06-01 (1960).
129. See, e.g., N.D. CENr. CODE § 51-07-07 (1960) (buyers of certain farm equipment have right to rescind, any disclaimer in the sale agreement notwithstanding). See
also UNWoRM CONSUMER CRErr CODE § 1.301(14), which defines a "consumer lease"
as any lease of goods to a person who takes "primarily for a personal, family, household,
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farmers, 8 0 and otherwise exempting them from government regulation.' 31 These statutes reflect the idea, valid in many instances, that
farmers are different from city dwellers, businessmen, record keepers,

and commercial interests.' 82
The farmer myth of American politics has its counterpart in law.
Before the common law absorbed the law merchant, commercial law
and farmers were strangers. 3 Sales rules of the common law, that is,
the law of chattels (whose Latin root is the same as that of "cattle"), 3 4
arose primarily out of farm transactions, the most common transactions
in goods outside formal markets. Mercantile sales were subject to the
rules of the law merchant. When the law merchant dissolved into the
common law, commercial law took on aspects of "chattel" law that ill
befit it. Professor Llewellyn proposed that commercial lawyers and

judges "unhorse" sales law 35 and rid it of rules designed for the yeoman farmer and not for the commercial businessman. 13 That distinction between farmer and merchant stayed with Professor Llewellyn
when he served as chief draftsman of Article 2 and as official reporter

for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and the American Law Institute when they sponsored the Code; and
or agricultural purpose." Congress may be changing its assumption that farmers are
ordinary consumers. The Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1667(1)
(Supp. 1977) excludes agricultural leases from its coverage; the Consumer Credit Protection Act § 104(5), 15 U.S.C. § 1603(5) (Supp. V 1975), gives narrower coverage to
agricultural than to other consumer transactions.
130. See Lewis, Farm and Hobby Losses After Tax Reform, 23 S. CAL. TAX INST.
627 (1971).
131. See Gilmore, Chattel Security II, 57 YALE L.J. 761, 786 (1948). Many of
these exceptions, of course, reflect that farming, although a business, differs from other
commercial activity. See, e.g., Frazier, OSHA and the Farmer: An Analysis and Critique, 1972 INS. L.J 439.
132. See, e.g., E. HIGBEE, supra note 126.
133. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HAMnv. L. REv. 873, 875-77
(1939).
134. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, Co mmE.NTrXES *385. The common source is the medieval
Latin "capitale" or "capitalis."

WEBSTER'S Trim NEw INTERNATioNAL DiCrIONARY 354,

380 (1967).
135. He was not, of course, entirely successful: "The sale of a horse is governed by
the Uniform Commercial Code . . . ." Presti v. Wilson, 348 F. Supp. 543, 545
(E.D.N.Y. 1972); accord, Key v. Bagen, 106 Ga. App. 373, 221 S.E.2d 234 (1975);
cf. Miller v. Kaye, - Utah 2d -, 545 P.2d 199 (1975) (Statute of Frauds provision
of the Code applies to transaction between "elephant merchants"). Early common
law accorded special rules to the sale of a horse. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*450-51.
136. See Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARv. L. REv. 725 (1939);
Llewellyn, supra note 133.
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it accounts for his opinion, stated on more than one occasion, that
farmers (whom he lumped together with "backwoodsmen," "small
towners," and "foreigners")' 3 7 were not merchants.,,
When this conventional image of the farmer is contrasted with the

conventional notion of a merchant as a peddler or tradesman, Cook
Grains, Inc. v. Fallis results.

In fact, of course, neither farmers nor

merchants conform to such conventional images.
C.

The Facts

Approximately 80% of agricultural sales in the United States come
from the 20% of all farms with annual sales of $20,000 or more and
total assets averaging $260,000 per farm. 13 9 Nearly one-quarter million
farms sold $40,000 or more in 1969 according to the most recent census; 140 more than 150,000 farms had at least $30,000 invested in equipment.'41 Farms require more capital than in the past 142 and small
farms find it difficult to obtain the needed investment.' 43 During the
1960's the number of farms fell by more than 25% ;144 this trend continues 45 as will the trend toward larger farms with larger capital
requirements.' 46 Equipment costs are high 47 and land costs continue
137. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 699, 720
(1936).
138. "[AII of these rest on a vital need for distinguishing merchants from housewives and from farmers. . . ." N.Y. HEARINGS, supra note 6, at 108 (testimony of K.
Llewellyn). "[NIon-land, non-farmer, non-consumer, as merchants' deals in very
sooth." Llewellyn, supra note 133, at 877.
139. A. NELSON, W. LEE, & W. MURRAY, AGRICULTURAL FINANCE (6th ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as A. NELSON].
140. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1 1TH GENERAL REPORT,
1969 CENSTS OF AGRiCULTURE 98 (June 1973) [hereinafter cited as CENSUS REPORT].
141. Id. at 123.
142. Doll, Farm Debt as Related to Value of Sales, 49 FED. RES. BULL. 140 (1963);
Hines, Special Problems in Planning the Agricultural Businessman's Estate, 7 U. MIAMI
INST. Esr. PLAN. 11-1, 11-2 (1973).
143. The number of farms with sales of over $20,000 per year is increasing. Smaller
farms are decreasing. CENSUS REPORT, supra note 140, at 100. The number of farms
smaller than 220 acres has declined since 1950. Id. at 55, 100-01.
144. Id. at 98; A. NELSON, supra note 139, at 6.
145. See, e.g., HarI, Estate and Business Planningfor Farmers,19 HASTINGS L.J, 271,
272 (1968).
146. Hines, supra note 142, at 11-2; see Agriculture: Growth Industry in the U.S.,
Bus. WEEK, April 28, 1973, at 62. Capital requirements for the "typical" cash grain
farm in the corn belt increased in just ten years from $97,000 to $203,000 and for the
"typical" southwest cattle ranch from $141,000 to $205,000. Senate Hearings, supra
note 124, at 93.
147. Hubert & Hauch, How Andrew Tills the Soil with a Computer, 1 SATURDAY REV.
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to climb.14 8

A large modem farm149 raises more livestock'80 and uses. more
equipment and chemicals,' 5 ' and more fuel, 52 than the smaller farms
of the past. The Census Bureau classifies as "farms" marginal operations by persons who derive their principal income from other
sources; 1 1 3 the typical farmer is therefore the manager of an even

larger enterprise than the foregoing figures suggest.
Not all courts labor under the farm myth. In one trial two farmers
complained that they could not compare acreage production from year
to year because they had failed to keep records. The judge responded
with incredulity:
The plaintiffs would excuse their failure to have records upon the old
saw that a farmer's work is never done and that they, therefore, have
no time to keep records, but some fine farmers in this area who have
appeared here as witnesses keep records, not only of the types of corn
they plant, the fertilization program they follow, and the fields specifically into which both of such were injected, but they even go as far
as to keep records of the ground temperatures and rainfall and the like,
which they testified were of future value to them in their vast operations.1 Z4
Soc'v, March 1973, at 52. Tractors can cost up to $25,000; combines from $35,000 to
$50,000; Harvestore Silos, $25,000. Sheets & Killpatrick, A Bumper Crop, But Don't
L ook for Cheaper Food Soon, U.S. NEws & WoRLn REP., June 28, 1975, at 25. More
than 250,000 farms in the United States have four or more tractors and more than
840,000 farms have two or three tractors. CENsus REPORT, supra note 140, at 9.
148. In 1969 there were 500,000 farms in the United States with land and buildings
\alued at $100,000 or more. CENSUS REPORT, supra note 140, at 56.
149. Id. at 56, 100; A. NELSON, supra note 139, at 6.
150. There are feed lots with capacity for 125,000 cattle, poultry processors with
3,750,000 broilers, and hog producers that feed 80,000 hogs in a year. These are
generally corporate farms. See 1972 Wis. L. REv. 1189. See also Senate Hearings,supra
note 124, at 43, 81.
151. See E. I-IGBEE, supra note 126, at 25.
152. American farmers now consume far more energy than is contained in the food
they produce. See Clark, Big and/or Little? Search is on for Right Technology,
SMrrsoNmL, July 1976, at 44.
153. See E. HiGBE, supra note 126, at 45.
154. Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co., 12 UCC REP. SERV. 629, 639 (W.D. Ky. 1972).
In his oral opinion Judge Gordon also observed: "If there is a moral to this law suit,
it is, it appears to me, if you can't plant corn early in a weather year like 1968, and
you are unwilling to take the risk, plant beans." id. at 641. Plaintiffs who dealt in
corn and farmed as well, sued for breach of warranty. They had purchased seed corn
for their own use as farmers and not for resale. The court, adopting an all-or-nothing
approach, held that the farmers were merchants, because they were seed merchants, even
though the transaction in question arose from their activity as farmers.
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Other courts, recognizing the increasing penetration of corporate
interests into agriculture, 155 have rejected the classic notion of the
farmer as "simple tiller of the soil" 158 and have distinguished between

"essentially commercial" farming and "bare, minimal subsistence agri1 57
culture.'
This last distinction between commercial and subsistence farming
suggests the obvious: a farmer can be a poor, illiterate, dirt farmer,
or a successful business person concerned with tax benefits, 58 incorporation, 59 and estate planning.8 0 "Farmer" is a loose, vague term, that
cannot aid courts in determining whether a person is a merchant and
may, because of its mythical trappings, interfere with that determina6
tion.' '

155. See, e.g., Lish v. Compton, - Utah 2d -, 547 P.2d 223 (1976) (concurring
opinion).
156. Ohio Grain Co. v. Swisshelm, 40 Ohio App. 2d 203, 206, 318 N.E.2d 428, 430
(1973):
He would represent defendant as a simple tiller of the soil, unaccustomed
to the affairs of business and the marketplace. Farming is no longer confined
to simple labor. Only an agri-businessman may hope to survive. This defendant was clearly familiar with farm markets and their operation and followed
them with some care. For example, he was familiar with the bean market in
Cincinnati, as well as that in his local community. In his many years of farming, he knew that corn was sold for varying prices, depending upon its moisture,
quality and condition, and admitted having some idea that the same was true of
beans.
Id.
157. Billings v. Joseph Harris Inc., 27 N.C. App. 689, 697, 220 S.E.2d 361, 367
(1975), affd, 290 N.C. 502, 226 S.E.2d 321 (1976).
158. See Harl, supra note 145; Lewis, supra note 130; Sharpe, What the Taxpayer
Should Do To Have The Courts Recognize His Farm As A Business, 28 J. TAx 48
(1968).
159. Harl, Considerations in IncorporatingFarm Businesses, 18 U. FLA. L. Rnv. 221
(1965); Israel, CorporateFarmingand the Money Tree, 4 GA. ST.BJ. 335 (1967).
160. "Today's farmer is far removed from the popular image of a sturdy man of
the soil, who toils in the open air with his plow and his pitchfork." Hines, supra note
142, ch. 73-11, at 11-1; see Har, supra note 145.
161. Generic terms such as "hawker," "druggist," or "farmer" should not determine
whether a person is a "merchant" under the Code. The term "farmer" itself best
illustrates the failure of attempting to determine merchant status by the application of
occupational terms. A farmer can be a laborer, a tenant, a rancher, a vintner,
a grower, a shepherd, a corporation, or a "gentleman." See Durham, Farmers and
Farming: Gentleman Farmers, New Hobby Loss Rules, Holding Period, Etc., N.Y.U.
29th INSt. FED. TAX. pt. 2, at 1527 (1971). Article 9 of the Code avoids the term
"farmer" altogether. Farm products are defined not as products used or produced by a
farmer but as products "in the possession of a debtor engaged in raising, fattening,
grazing, or other farming operations." U.C.C. § 9-109(3); cf. § 9-401 2d & 3d
alternative subsection (1)(a) ("equipment used in farming operations"). Article 9
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Professor Llewellyn's disposition to the contrary notwithstanding,
Article 2 is at least neutral on the question whether a farmer may be
a merchant. Two comments appear to favor the notion that farmers
may be merchants under some circumstances. The entrusting provision stipulates that one buying from a merchant who deals in goods
of the kind takes free of a security interest in the entrusting party. 1 2
Comment 2 of this section notes that the rule is "limited" by the more
specific provisions of section 9-307(1), which provides that a buyer in
ordinary course of business buying farm products from a farmer does
not take free of a security interest created by that farmer. 16 3 The
allusion to the section 9-307 exception for farm sales suggests that a
farmer can be a merchant dealing in goods of the kind under the entrusting section. The second comment which bears on this question
is Comment 2 of the warranty of merchantability provision,8 4 which
applies only to merchants with respect to goods of the kind. The predecessor of that provision, section 15(2) of the Uniform Sales Act, contained reference to "grower"; Comment 2 says that omission of the
term "grower" from the current provision "does not restrict the applicability of this section" 1 5--implying that a grower, i.e., a farmer,
can be a merchant under the merchantability provision.
The 1972 revision of the Code acknowledged that farmers are businessmen rather than consumers by deleting the exemption from filing
requirements for farm purchases of under $2,500.1166 That provision
7
had assumed that sales to farmers were akin to sales to consumers .'
Its removal belies the assumption.
The effort to categorize "farmers" as a class ignores the imprecise
nature of the term and the underlying reasons of the merchant sections.
thereby avoids the perplexing problem of determining who is a farmer; the less difficult
but still perplexing problem of determining what are farming operations, remains.
See Sequoia Mach. Co. v. Jarrett, 410 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1969); In re La Rose, 7
UCC REP. SERv. 964 (Ref. in Bktcy, D. Conn. 1970); In re Anderson, 6 UCC REP.
SERv. 1284 (Ref. in Bktcy, S.D. Ohio 1969); In re Leiby, 1 UCC REP. SERv. 428 (Ref.
in Bktcy, E.D. Pa. 1962); Citizens Nat'1 Bank v. Sperry Rand Corp., 456 S.W.2d 273
(Tex. Ct. App. 1970).
162. U.C.C. § 2-403(2).
163. Id., Comment 2.
164. U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 2.
165. Id.
166. Compare U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (c) (1962 version), with U.C.C. § 9-302.
167. See Coogan & Mays, Crop Financing & Article 9: A Dialogue with Particular
Emphasis on the Problems of Florida Citrus Crop Financing,22 U. MIAMi L. REv. 13,
19 (1967).
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The general Code policy to "modernize the law governing commercial
transactions" 168 and provide "machinery for expansion of commercial
practices" 169 would be carried out more -effectively if courts would
employ the flexible provisions of the Code, such as the merchant definition, to expand or contract Code application as circumstances change.
As farmers become business people, and move away from Professor
Llewellyn's haystack and barnyard metaphors, courts should feel free
to bring farmers within the scope of the Code.
While farmers can be merchants, not all farmers are merchants. The
farmer cases illustrate the error of a prioriclassification of occupations.
Courts must classify individual farmers in accordance with the Code's
merchant definition. A person who sells grain under a futures contract
ought to be a merchant subject to the merchant good-faith rule. He
or she should be bound to answer letters and read fine print. The
futures transaction is essentially commercial, is an integral step in the
distribution of agricultural commodities, and calls for the simplified
principles the merchant rules provide. 10 Those who are concerned
that large grain companies will take advantage of farmers who do not
know the usages of the trade, can find solace in the fact that the merchant good-faith rules apply to grain companies too. Any attempt by
such a commodity dealer to take advantage of a farmer who it knows,
or reasonably should know, is unfamiliar with trade practices, would
itself be guilty of bad faith conduct and subject to the Code's proscriptions.171
168. U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (a).
169. U.C.C. § 1-102, Comment 1.
170. In the Statute of Frauds cases, courts have seldom mentioned that grain elevators which buy products from farmers for future delivery promptly resell to larger
elevators or members of the Board of Trade. These resales are often made by telephone,
and the trade in futures demands promptness and reliability. If farmers were permitted
to renege on oral agreements confirmed in writing the trade in futures contracts would
be upset. See Continental Grain Co. v. Harbach, 400 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Ill. 1975);
Continental Grain Co. v. Brown, 19 UCC REP. SERV. 52 (W.D. Wis. 1976).
171. See U.C.C. §§ 1-103, 1-203, 2-302. See also Majors v. Kalo Laboratories, Inc.,
407 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Ala. 1975); Oloffson v. Coomer, 11 Ill. App. 3d 918, 296 N.E.2d
871 (1973). But see Billings v. Joseph Harris Inc., 27 N.C. App. 689, 220 S.E.2d 361
(1975). See also U.C.C. §§ 2-613 & 2-615, Comment 9. In short, the Code makes
provisions for the unique hazards of farming. A merchant farmer must take care,
however, to come within the scope of these protective provisions. See Bunge Corp. v.
Recker, 519 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1975); Dunavant Enterprises, Inc. v. Ford, 294 So.2d 788
(Miss. 1974); Semo Grain Co. v. Oliver Farms, Inc., 530 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. Ct. App.

1975).
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THE WARRANTY PROVISIONS

The Code's two warranty provisions impose significant burdens on
merchants who regularly deal in goods. The warranty of merchantability section, 172 a prolific source of litigation of merchant questions,
obliges merchants to sell only goods that are generally acceptable in
the trade. The warranty against infringement section' 3 requires merchants, in most instances, to deliver goods free from third-party claims
of infringement. Both sections assume that buyers from such merchants expect such warranties, and both sections reflect a policy that
losses caused by unmerchantable or infringing goods should fall on the
sellers who deal in such goods. 17 4
Courts at one time imposed liability on sellers on the theory that
sellers were familiar with their goods.'7 5 That rationale will no longer
serve as a primary justification for an implied warranty of merchantability. 1' 6 Later decisions hold a retailer liable for goods in unopened
containers' 77 or for products about which he otherwise had no knowledge.' 7' The primary reason for finding such liability is a policy judgment that the seller should bear the loss from product defects; 79 a

secondary justification is the buyer's expectation that goods will be merchantable. 8 0
The warranty of merchantability applies only to one who is a merchant "with respect to goods of that kind."'' Claims under this provision should hinge on a determination of whether the seller is a mer172. U.C.C. § 2-314.
173. U.C.C. § 2-312(3).
174. U.C.C. § 2-312, Comment 3; U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 11.
175. See, e.g., McQuaid v. Ross, 85 Wis. 492, 55 N.W. 705 (1893).
176. It retains vitality as a secondary rationale, however. See 1 W. HAWKLAND,
supra note 6, at 70; Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN.L.
RaV. 117, 119 (1943).
177. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 147 Colo. 358, 363 P.2d 667 (1961);
Ward v. Great Adt. & Pac. Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 N.E. 225 (1918).
178. See, e.g., Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 377 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1967).
179. See 1 W. HAWELAND, supra note 6, at 70; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A, Comment c (1965); 8 S. WiLLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
985, at 545 (3d ed. Jaeger 1964); Prosser, supra note 176, at 119.
180. "The warranty of merchantability, wherever it is normal, is so commonly taken
for granted that its exclusion from the contract is a matter threatening surprise and
therefore requiring special precaution." U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 11.
181. U.C.C. § 2-314.
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chant, but the cases in this area are badly confused, in part because
of the separate common-law products liability issue that is often
present, and in part because the courts have failed to fix correctly the
merchant definition.
In some instances the merchant question is in sharp focus. Manufacturers, though not merchants under the law merchant, 8 2 clearly are
merchants for purposes of Article 2,183 as are retailers' 8 4 and whole-

salers in general, 8 8 dealers, 8 6 agricultural suppliers, 8 7 food processors,' 18 and brokers.18 9 A merchant in the traditional sense may not
be a merchant in the Code sense, however. A bank that sells a repossessed boat 90 is not a merchant with respect to the boat for purposes
of the merchantability section. This case is consistent with the buyer's
expectations but perhaps not with the other policies embodied in the
section.
A merchant may leave the merchant status by acting outside of the
scope of that status, as when a food caterer gratuitously prepares a
182. 3 WORDS AND PHASES (JUDICIALLY DEFINED) 360 (1944).
183. See, e.g., Chemico Indus. Applicators Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366
F. Supp. 278 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Hester v. Purex Corp., 534 P.2d 1306 (Okla. 1975); Bell
v. Harrington Mfg. Co., 265 S.C. 468, 219 S.E.2d 906 (1975).
184. See, e.g., Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distrib. Co., 355 F.2d
114 (3d Cir. 1966); Campanelli v. Conservas Altamira, S.A., 86 Nev. 838, 477 P.2d 870
(1970); Williams v. Western Sur. Co., 6 Wash. App. 300, 492 P.2d 596 (1972).
185. See, e.g., Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental Sys. Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d 35,
312 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1970).
186. E.g., Georgia Timberlands, Inc. v. Southern Airway Co., 125 Ga. App. 404, 188
S.E.2d 108 (1972); Charney v. Ocean Pontiac, Inc., 17 UCC RPP. SEav. 982 (Mass.
Dist. Ct. 1975); Litchfield v. Dueitt, 245 So.2d 190 (Miss. 1971); Testo v. Russ
Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 (1976).
187. See, e.g., Jorritsma v. Farmers Feed & Supply Co., 272 Or. 499, 538 P.2d 61
(1975); Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
188. See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. L.D. Schreiber Cheese Co., 326 F. Supp. 504
(W.D. Mo. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. L.D. Schreiber Cheese Co. v.
Standard Milk Co., 457 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1972).
189. See, e.g., John Thallon & Co. v. M & N Meat Co., 396 F. Supp. 1239 (E.D.N.Y.
1975); Stratton Sale Barn, Inc. v. Reed, 28 Agric. Dec. 1418, 7 UCC REP. SmEv. 192
(1969); David Pepper Co. v. Jack Keller Co., 28 Agric. Dec. 474, 6 UCC REP. SERv.
673 (1969); S-Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Monier & Co., 509 P.2d 777 (Wyo. 1973). But cf.
Toyomenka, Inc. v. Mount Hope Finishing Co., 432 F.2d 722 (4th Cir. 1970) (customs
broker acting as bailee for plaintiff not a merchant). One case reaches the questionable
holding that even an auctioneer can be a merchant for purposes of U.C.C. § 2-314.
Regan Purchase & Sales Corp. v. Primavera, 68 Misc. 2d 858, 328 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Civ.

Ct. 1972).
190. See Donald v. City Nat'l Bank, 295 Ala. 320, 329 So.2d 92 (1976).
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church supper,' 91 a banker buys fishing gear for himself,' 92 or a saw
mill operator sells an old saw. 9 3 In the two former cases the defend-

ant clearly acted as a non-mercantile person rather than as a merchant
as defined by the Code. In the last case, the seller is not holding him-

self out as one who warrants the goods to conform with trade standards,
and the merchant definition should not be applied.' 94
VII.

NEOPHYTES

Commentators have asked whether a hobbyist who buys and sells, 9 5
or a lawyer'9 6 or professor 9 7 familiar with trade practices, "deals"
in goods and is subject to merchant rules. Courts have found such
questions difficult. Instead of looking to the purpose of the merchant rule at issue, they have examined the nature of the defendant or
his primary occupation. Thus, courts have held, incorrectly it seems,
that a testamentary trustee' 98 and a municipality 9 were free from merchant duties although engaged in mercantile or proprietary activity.
These cases, like some of the opinions concerning farmers, seem to rest
on no more than a vague notion that trustees and cities are not merchants.
191. See Wentzel v. Berliner, 204 So.2d 905 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). Professor
Nordstrom suggests, however, that if a church hires a professional caterer it may become
a merchant for warranty purposes under the "employment of an agent" language of
U.C.C. § 2-104. R. NODS-tROM, supra note 5, at 240. That conclusion is consistent with
the reason of U.C.C. § 2-314 because it reflects the reasonable expectation of a buyer.
192. See U.C.C. § 2-104, Comment 2.
193. See Siemen v. Alden, 34 Ill. App. 3d 961, 341 N.E.2d 713 (1975); accord, Balido
v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1973); cf. 2 N.Y.
HEAuENGs, supra note 6, at 1124; U.C.C. § 9-307, Comment 2 (1952 version) (merchant
not often "in the business of selling" his own old equipment). The question implicit in
Siemen is whether the saw mill operator would be a merchant for purposes of the Statute
of Frauds if the buyer had sent a written confirmation of an oral agreement to sell the
old saw.
194. See Samson v. Riesing, 62 Wis.2d 698, 215 N.W.2d 662 (1974).
"The
Wauwatosa Band Mothers, although selling the food, were not merchants as contemplated by the statute." Id. at 711, 215 N.W.2d at 669.
195. Newell, supra note 17, at 321; See also Duesenberg & King, supra note 17, §
2.0412], at 2-64.
196. Kripke, supra note 13, at 321-25.
197. See 3 N.Y. HEAIMGS, supra note 6, at 2165.
198. See Wilmington Trust Co. v. Coulter, 41 Del. Ch. 548, 200 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct.
1964) (sale of securities).
199. See Coast Laundry, Inc. v. Lincoln City, 9 Or. App. 521, 497 P.2d 1224 (1972).
But see Baker v. City of Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971).
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The courts' preoccupation with the primary activity or characteristic
of the party200 have led them into the related error of holding that one
who would otherwise be a merchant leaves that status when engaging
in a secondary or new activity, even though the enterprise is clearly
mercantile.
Thus in Rock Creek GingerAle Co. v. Thermice Corp.,2 10 the court

concluded that a brewer's business was the selling of beer, not its
carbon dioxide by-product, and that sales of more than 700,000 pounds
of the gas over a five-month period did not render the defendant a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.202 A holding of merchant
status in Rock Creek would have fulfilled the reasonable expectations

of the buyer and thereby better served the underlying purposes of the
merchantability section. Similarly, in Playboy Clubs International,Inc.
v. Loomskill, Inc.,20 3 the court thwarted the reasonable expectation of
the parties by holding that the club did not have to respond to its mail

as a merchant must, because it was "an ultimate consumer" of the textiles involved in the transaction, not a merchant in the textile business.
Nothing in the fine print sections suggests such a result.

Equally questionable are those cases which appear to give the merchant one free shot. In Fear Ranches, Inc. v. Berry204 the court re-

fused to find a warranty of merchantability in a rancher's first sale of
livestock to another rancher. The court declined to consider the defendant's prior sales of livestock for slaughter. Those sales, the court
argued, involved a "different classification of stock ''2 r, and were not
sales of "that kind" of goods, as the merchantability section requires. 20 0
200. In the farmer cases, for example, the courts sometimes gave too much importance to the skill of cultivating crops and not enough to the skill in marketing them. See
Sierens v. Clausen, 21 Ill.
App. 3d 450, 315 N.E.2d 897 (1974), rev'd, 60 Ill.
2d 585,
328 N.E.2d 559 (1975); Oloffson v. Coomer, 11 ill. App. 3d 918, 296 N.E.2d 871
(1973) (dictum); Sand Seed Service, Inc. v. Poeckes, 249 N.W.2d 663 (Iowa 1977).
201. 352 F. Supp. 522 (D.D.C. 1971).
202. Cf. Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental Sys. Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d 35, 312
N.Y.S.2d 317 (1970) (auto leasing company is in the business of leasing automobiles,
not selling them, even though it customarily sells its used cars). Contra, American Nat'l
Bank v. Mar-K-Z Motors & Leasing Co., 57 Ill.
2d 29, 309 N.E.2d 567 (1974). The
issue is whether the seller is a person in the business of selling goods of that kind under
the buyer in ordinary course section. U.C.C. § 1-201(9). See also Bruce v. MartinMarietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976).
203. 13 UCC REP. SERv. 765, 766 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
204. 470 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1972).
205. Id. at 907.
206. U.C.C. § 2-314. The Fear Ranches court remanded with directions to impose
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In Victor v. Barzaleski,207 an early Code case, the court held that the
sale by a "general handyman"208 of a boiler was not subject to the merchantability section. More startling was the result in Storey v. Day
Heating and Air Conditioning Co.,20 9 in which the court refused to

impose warranty liability on an air conditioning company which sold a
defective condensate pump for an air conditioning system, because the
plaintiff failed to marshal evidence to show that this was not the only
such pump the seller had ever sold. These cases ignore altogether the
reasonable expectation of a buyer, who usually cannot be charged with
knowledge that this sale is the first by the seller or, even if so chargeable, should not reasonably expect less than merchantable quality from
any p2rson holding himself out as a professional.
The better reasoned cases so hold. In McHugh v. Carlton,21 0 a service-station operator who customarily did not sell recapped tires was
nonetheless liable for defects in such a tire he ordered specially. In
Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co.,"' a manufacturer of plastic
parts that filled an order for parts of a kind it had never made before,
unsuccessfully argued that it was not a merchant with respect to such
goods; in Mutual Services of Highland Park, Inc. v. S.O.S. Plumbing
& Severage Co.,21 2 the court appears to have held the defendant to

be a merchant with respect to a hammer and bit, even though the goods
were not part of the general line of hammers and bits the defendant customarily sold. In these opinions the courts respond to the reasons of
the warranty if "the finding relative to usage in such a transaction so dictates." Fear
Ranches, Inc. v. Berry, 470 F.2d 905, 908 (10th Cir. 1972). It is difficult to understand
how a seller of goods can be subject to trade usages and not be a merchant with respect
to goods of that trade. Commercial standards, trade usage and trade customs are hallmarks of the merchant class. U.C.C. § 2-104 (referring to "deals" and "by his occupation"). Such prompting was not lost on the District Court which found on remand:
"'There is a usage of trade in the cattle industry in New Mexico that a knowledgeable
buyer, relying entirely on his own judgment, in buying cattle from a knowledgeable seller, who makes no representations as to the condition of the cattle, takes the animals as
he selects them . . . .'" Fear Ranchers, Inc. v. Berry, 503 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1974)
(quoting the trial court). Cf. Jamestown Terminal Elevator, Inc. v. Wieb, 246 N.W.2d
736 (N.D. 1976) (course of dealing between the parties and usage of trade in the
particular vocation or trade may determine what is a "reasonable time" for delivery
when such is not specified in the agreement).
207. 19 Pa. D.&C.2d 698, 1 UCC REP. SEnv. 104 (CL C.P. 1959).
208. Id. at 700, 1 UCC REP. SERV. at 106.
209. 56 Ala. App. 81, 319 So. 2d 279 (Civ. App. 1975).
210. 369 F. Supp. 1271 (D.S.C. 1974).
211. 402 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Conn. 1975).
212. 93 Ill.
App. 2d 257, 235 N.E.2d 265 (1968) (abs. dec.).
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the merchantability section but seldom articulate them. In Blockhead,

the court recognized that the defendant's argument would exempt all
custom manufacturing from the merchantability provision; 218 in McHugh, the court stressed the profit motive of the seller.214 Neither
court came to grips with the problem-that the buyers reasonably expected to receive goods of merchantable quality and expected the

sellers to stand behind that quality even though they might never have
sold the goods before. 21 5
VIII.

THE PRoFEssIoNs

The problem with the profession cases is best illustrated by a line
of New York cases beginning with a mischievous pre-Code case, Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital.2"" The court, to avoid imposing seller's

liability on a hospital in a blood transfusion case, reached the "unrealistic" 217 conclusion that the sale of blood to a patient by a hospital
is not a sale of goods. The Perlmutter case responded to a strongly
felt need. Its progeny has been numerous. Legislatures, overturning
cases to the contrary or heading off the possibility of such contrary results, have enacted statutes to the same effect.21 8 The passion of Perlmutter's defenders gives rise to questionable reasoning and puzzling
dicta. In Lovett v. Emory University, Inc.,21 9 for example, the court
argued that the Code implicitly excludes other services from the warranty section by singling out the serving of food and drink for in213. "The implication of this suggestion is that manufacturers who produce a variety
of goods and would never fall within the broad scope intended for [the merchantability
section]. That contention must be rejected where unmerchantability results from defects
in the production process with which the manufacturer is familiar." 402 F. Supp. at 1025.
Contra, LTV Aerospace Corp. v. Bateman, 492 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973).
214. "Defendant retailer cannot have it both ways-make a profit from the sale of
recaps but deny liability if they are defective." 369 F. Supp. at 1277.
215. A seller can argue that the first sale of an item does not make him a "merchant
with respect to goods of that kind." U.C.C. § 2-314. The court in Storey v. Day
Heating & Air Conditioning Co., 56 Ala. App. 81, 319 So. 2d 279 (Civ. App. 1975),
accepted that reasoning. The court in Mutual Serv. Inc. v. S.O.S. Plumbing & Sewerage
Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 257, 235 N.E.2d 265 (1968) did not. The latter holding is more
consistent with the reason of the merchantability section.
216. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
217. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 IlI. 2d 443, 450, 266 N.E.2d 897,
901 (1970).
218. See statutes collected in Heirs of Fruge v. Blood Serv., 365 F. Supp. 1344, 1350
n.3 (W.D. La. 1973). See also N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:8-b (Equity Supp. 1975).
219. 116 Ga. App. 277, 156 S.E.2d 923 (1967).
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clusion.220 In fact, the merchantability section's reference to food and
drink is in response, as the Comment indicates, 2 1 to an ancient line
of cases holding the contrary; the Lovett opinion's construction is wholly
unjustified. 2 In another opinion 2 2 relying on Perlmutter, the court
said that hospitals supply a great variety of items and no purveyor
should be responsible for the quality of so many products. The court
failed to explain why the same argument should not apply to a department store or supermarket, 2 2 both of which clearly fall within the purview of the merchantability section.22 5 In another hospital case, the
court concluded that "legal principles" should not apply to a "purely
non-legal exchange";2201 still another case 22 7 suggested that it would be
"socialistic" to hold hospitals liable for defects in the goods they sell. 228
Not all service professions have escaped seller liability. Hairdressers
who do not enjoy the same status as doctors in the nation's psyche, are
liable for defective products dispensed in connection with their services, although the courts' attempts to distinguish them from medical
2 29
practitioners have not proved convincing.
In the transfusion cases the courts may be concerned about the impossibility of detecting serum hepatitis in a donor's blood, and may wish
to protect charitable activity from rules fashioned for the business sector.2 30 Neither of these latter considerations apply to doctors dis220. U.C.C § 2-314(1)
221. U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 5.
222. See Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 53 NJ. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969). See
generally 31 OHio ST. L.J. 580, 582 (1972).
223. Schuchman v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 9 UCC REP. SERv. 637, 647 (Md. Super.

Ct. 1971).
224. See Waite, supra note 19, at 619 (criticizing the rule as to retailers on the same
grounds).
225. See authorities cited note 177 supra.
226. Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 6 UCC REP. SEnv. 779, 785 (Pa. Ct. C.P.
1969), rev'd and remanded, 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970); cfi. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Counsel, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683, 686 (E.D. Va.
1974), affd on other grounds, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) ("Instantly, the actual suitors are
consumers; their concern is fundamentally deeper than a trade consideration. While it
touches commerce closely, the overriding worry is the hinderance to a means for
preserving health or even saving lives.").
227. Dorfman v. Austenal, Inc., 3 UCC REP.SERV. 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).

228. Id. at 857.
229. See Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969); Ellibee v.
Dye, 64 Pa. D.&C.2d 158, 15 UCC RP. SuRv. 361 (Ct. C.P. 1973).
230. "Consideration of hospital, doctor, dentist, and other medical services cases brings
confusing results because of the desire of the courts to protect those who are rendering
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pensing other goods; yet courts have readily extended Perlmutter's
protection to physicians supplying pacemakers, 3 1 surgical pins, 23 2 and
intrauterine devices. 233 Most legislation is not similarly broad.234 The
true basis of the health-care cases therefore seems to be the courts'
somewhat irrational belief that the relations between doctor and hospital on the one hand and patients on the other should not be governed
by commercial rules. In effect the courts have determined that doctors
and hospitals are not merchants, but this holding is never made explicit
because of the confusion between warranty claims under the Code and
the strict liability23 5 claims with which they are usually associated. 2 0
If the irrational element in the health-care cases is rejected, there is
no good reason to refrain from applying the merchant rules to all service
professionals. If Perlmutter'sdistinction between services and sales is
faulty, and well considered authority supports the view that it is,-'37 the
delivery of health goods is a sale subject to Article 2. Doctors, dentists, hospitals, and the practitioners of any service profession may be
merchants whenever they fall within the Code's definition, as all of
them often do. Service professionals not only "deal" in goods, but they
most assuredly hold themselves out by their occupation or by their employment of others as possessing knowledge and skill peculiar to the
goods involved in the transaction. The universal agreement of the authorities 2 8 and the Comments 239 that the "professional" as opposed to
the "casual" status of the seller is the hallmark of the merchant, and
health and life saving services to the public."

Ellibee v. Dye, 64 Pa. D.&C.2d 158, 160,

15 UCC REP. SERv. 361, 363 (Ct. C.P. 1973).

231. See Cutler v. General Elec. Co., 4 UCC REP. SERY. 300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
232. See Cheshire v. Southampton Hosp. Ass'n, 53 Misc. 2d 355, 278 N.Y.S.2d 531
(Sup. Ct. 1967).
233. See Ruybe v. Gordon, 18 UCC REP. SERV. 889 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). See
generally 11 CAL. W.L. REV. 347 (1975).
234. The statutes protect doctors but usually relate only to blood or tissue transplants. See note 218 supra.
235. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TORTS § 402A (1965).
236. The confusion of the two causes of action is evident in Parish v. B.F. Goodrich,
Co., 395 Mich. 271, 235 N.W.2d 570 (1975), where on a breach-of-warranty claim the
Supreme Court of Michigan rejected the Code's statute of limitations for warranty claims
(U.C.C. § 2-725) in favor of a general statute of limitations for personal injuries.
2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974).
Contra,Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill.
237. See generally Farnsworth, Implied Warrantiesof Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57
COLUM. L. REv. 653 (1957).
238. See authorities cited note 13 supra.
239. U.C.C. § 2-104, Comment 1.
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the significant fact that professions, by definition, observe standards, custom, and usage, all support the position that such professionals as doctors
may indeed be merchants when they sell goods. Certainly a patient
or client expects goods he receives from a professional to be merchantable, and to deny that expectation frustrates an underlying reason of
the merchantability section.
In brief, emotional freight has tended to exclude the professions
from the merchant class. Common sense and the policy of the Code require their inclusion.
IX.

OTHER "SERVICE" CONTRACTS

The distinction between services and sales has also troubled courts
in construction contract cases. In Schenectady Steel Co. v. Bruno
Trimpoli General Construction Co.,2 40 for example, the court declined
to apply the adequate assurance of performance section, because, it
said, Article 2 did not apply to the transaction. The plaintiff agreed
to supply the defendant with steel for a bridge and to prepare and erect
the steel. The court, citing Perlmutter, held that this contract was for
services and the Code, therefore, did not apply.2 ' Similarly, in Nitrin,
Inc. v.Bethlehem Steel Corp.,24 " the court held that a construction contract to supply labor and materials was outside the scope of the merchantability section, because the contract language evidenced a service
and not a sale transaction. In Busch v. United Metal Aluminum Products Corp.,2 43 the court characterized a contract to remodel a kitchen
as a service contract despite the defendant's obligation to furnish appliances, cabinets, and other materials.
Although these cases represent the general trend, other courts have
refused to base decisions on the service/sales distinction. Storey v.
240. 43 App. Div. 2d 234, 350 N.Y.S.2d 920, af 'd, 34 N.Y.2d 939, 316 N.E.2d 875,

359 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1974).
241.

Id.

Contra, Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108, 117 (1884)

(a

bridge-construction contract: "The transaction, if not technically a sale, created between the parties the relation of vendor and vendee."). A bona fide service-sale
distinction can be confusing in other settings. In Lewis v. Big Powderhorn Mountain Ski
Corp., 69 Mich. App. 437, 245 N.W.2d 81 (1976), the court refused to impose implied
warranty liability because there was no sale of a product when a skier sustained injury
while using a rope tow. Cf. Gulask v. Stylarama, 33 Conn. Supp. 108, 364 A.2d 1221
(C.P. 1975) (contract to supply labor and materials and construct and install a
swimming pool not a transaction in or sale of "goods").
App. 3d 577, 342 N.E.2d 65 (1976).
242. 35 Ill.
243. 8 UCC REP. SERv. 335 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
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Day Heating and Air Conditioning Co.,24 4 and Victor v. Barzaleski,245
both included substantial services. The courts refused to impose war-

ranty obligation on the sellers, not because of the service distinction
but because the courts were not satisfied that the sellers were merchants with respect to the goods sold. Other courts, however, have

held contracts to install bowling lanes, 240 a heating system, 24" a gas system,2 48 and to fabricate a mast 249 subject to merchant rules.
These construction-contract cases resemble the professional cases.
Admittedly, the construction contractors do not fall into the traditional
notion of merchant; but placed against the parameters of the merchant
definition, they lie well within it. Contractors "deal" in construction
materials, and by their occupation they hold themselves out as posses-

sing knowledge and skill peculiar to these goods. Their buyers, moreover, expect, no less reasonably than other buyers, that goods they receive will be merchantable.

A liberal construction of the merchant definition is better than any
attempt to weigh the services against the sale aspect of a contract. That
distinction is arbitrary250 and is contrary to the trend in other contexts
of imposing warranty liability on landlords and builders. 251 Regrettably,
the overwhelming majority of courts faced with this issue do not dis-

cuss the merchant question at all.
244. 56 Ala. App. 81, 319 So. 2d 279 (Civ. App. 1975); cf. Gable v. Silver, 258 So.
2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), afl'd, 264 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1972) (seller of condominiums
furnished with defective air conditioning units not a merchant because not dealing in
goods).
245. 19 Pa. D.&C.2d 698, 1 UCC REP. SErv. 104 (Ct. C.P. 1959).
246. See Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974).
247. See Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897, 12 Cal.
Rptr.257 (1961).
248. See Worrell v. Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971). The court relied on
strict tort liability notions to reach the result.
249. See Mercanti v. Persson, 160 Conn. 468, 280 A.2d 137 (1971).
250. The service-sale distinction sometimes taxes the ingenuity of counsel. In
Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 447 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1971), counsel
for Ralston argued that the feed lot operator to whom Ralston had sold feed supplement
could not maintain an action for breach of warranty because Ralston provided its
technical experts to advise the operator on which feed supplements would be best for his
herd. The attorney contended, unsuccessfully, that his client had provided a "service"
and that a claim of breach of warranty therefore could not arise.
251. See, e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Seabrook v. Commuter Housing Co., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Civ. Ct. 1972),
aff'd, 79 Misc. 2d 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d 566 (App. Term 1973); Humber v. Morton, 426
S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968). See also Levine, The Warranty of Habitability, 2 CoNN. L.
Rnv. 61 (1969); 28 STAN. L. REV. 357 (1976).
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LEASES

Lease transactions have greatly increased in volume and sophistication since the adoption of the Code. 2 There are three general kinds
of lease: a classic true lease, a tax avoidance lease, and a lease purchase. The first is the traditional arrangement made by A who owns
goods and leases them to B for a definite period of time, usually shorter
than the life of the goods. The tax avoidance lease is used to save
the lessor taxes and finance purchases by the lessee; 253 the lease purchase is simply a financing arrangement by the lessee. In the tax avoidance lease, the lessor is usually an investor or a credit institution, who
knows little if anything about the leased goods, which the lessee himself may have selected or even purchased and resold. The leasepurchase lessor may be a third party lending institution or may be a
seller providing credit to his buyer.
While Article 2 applies to "transactions in goods"' 4 and, therefore,
arguably extends to leases,2 5 other sections indicate that the Article
applies only to contracts relating to the "sale of goods."'2 56 The merchantability section specifically applies to goods and "a contract for
their sale.'' 257

Courts, nonetheless, have applied that section by ana-

logy in what they see as appropriate lease situations.

The lease most

252. Gritta & Lynagh, Aircraft Leasing-Panacea or Problem? 5 TRANsP. LJ. 9
(1973); Hawkland, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on Equipment
Leasing, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 446.
253. The tax-avoidance lease customarily involves a lessor (a partnership, individual,
or bank holding company) with high income and a corresponding capacity to use
accelerated depreciation and investment credits, and a lessee with a low profit margin
(an airline, for example). Because of the tax shelter such a lease creates, the lessor is
willing to lease at lower rental payments than would otherwise be profitable. The device
uses the vagaries of the Internal Revenue Code to facilitate acquisition of equipment by
enterprises which might otherwise not be able to afford that equipment. The leveraged
lease, often referred to in the literature, is simply a tax-avoidance lease with a third
party, the lessor's financer, involved. See generally Javaras & Nelson, The New
Leveraged Lease Guidelines, 53 TAxis 388 (1975). The 1976 Tax Reform Act limits
the tax benefits of these shelters. See I.R.C. § 465(c) (1) (C).
254. "Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to transactions in
goods. . . ." U.C.C. § 2-102.
255. See Hawkland, supra note 252, at 459. Professor Hawkland suggests that if
U.C.C. § 2-102 does not bring true leases within the scope of Article 2, they may still be
subject to the Article's rules by analogy. Id.
256. U.C.C. § 2-106 (emphasis added); cf. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(a) & (d) (In the
context of Article 2, a buyer and seller are only those who buy or sell or contract to buy
or sell goods.).
257. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (emphasis added).
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closely analogous to a sale (in fact it may well be a sale) is the leasepurchase transaction, to which courts have readily applied the merchant
rules.2 58 The true lease, which arguably falls outside the letter of Code
coverage, is more difficult. In Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing &
Rental Service, 59 however, one court argued persuasively in favor of
extending coverage where the expectations of the lessee (and the
lessor) are better served by imposing the merchantability warranty.
A more perplexing problem is posed by tax avoidance or third-party
lease finance situations. Should the warranty extend to a group of
lawyers or doctors who form a partnership to purchase an aircraft specified by and to be leased to a commercial airline? 20 This question is
analogous to the controversy over the right of consumers to assert
defenses against third party financers. 2 11 A finance company that is a
cognate of the seller should bear the warranty burden. A more distant
lender probably should not.
Section 2-102 exempts from the coverage of Article 2 those transactions which are in the form of a sale but which are intended "to operate only as a security transaction. 262 One commentator suggests that
since the Code sets out rules for determining whether a lease is intended as security,263 that Code provision should determine whether
leases intended as security, however, may
warranties arise. 264 Some la
raise the lessee's reasonable expectations that the goods are merchantable and that the lessor stands behind them. If the transaction out of
which the lease arises has no sale aspects, however, and operates only
258. See, e.g., Quality Acceptance Corp. v. Million & Albers. Inc., 367 F. Supp. 771
(D. Wyo. 1973); Morris Plan Leasing Co. v. Bingham Feed & Grain Co., 259 Iowa 404,
143 N.W.2d 404 (1966). See generally Farnsworth, supra note 237; Hawkland, supra
note 252; Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the UCC, 39 FoRDHAM
L. REv. 447 (1971).
259. 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); accord, W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United
Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970); Glenn Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc.,
97 Idaho 216, 541 P.2d 1184 (1975); Baker v. City of Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484
P.2d 405 (1971). In one case the court imposed warranty liability without discussing
that there was a lease rather than a contract of sale. Murray v. Kleen Leen, Inc., 41 Ill.
App. 3d 436, 354 N.E.2d 415 (1976).
260. Two commentators think not. See Hawkland, supra note 252; 1974 U. ILL.
L.F. 154.
261. See generally 2 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON'S UNIFORM COMMERcIAL CODE § 3-

302:14, at 826 (2d ed. 1971); J. WHrrE & R.
14-8, at 479 (1972).
262. U.C.C. § 2-102 (emphasis added).
263. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
264. Murray, supra note 258.
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as a security transaction, section 2-102 should exclude it from the Article and there should be no warranties. The lessee in such a case
should not reasonably expect them. A lender who buys equipment
selected by the lessee, as is often the case in the tax avoidance lease
situation, or a lender who acquires equipment leases, does not "deal"
in that equipment or otherwise hold itself out as possessing knowledge
peculiar to it. The lessee in these cases should not expect its lessor
to answer for the quality of the leased goods. The rule ought not be
rigid, however. Instances where a course of dealing raises contrary expectations should yield contrary results. Courts, moreover, must accord
due weight to the Code's obvious policy in favor of buyers. If reasonable expectations of lessor and lessee differ, the rule should satisfy the
lessee.
XI.

CONCLUSION

Controversy over the merchant definition has centered on the Statute
of Frauds and the merchantability sections. Consideration of the scope
of the definition, however, should extend to the good faith sections and
to the professional, service, and lease situations.

The Code's general definition of "merchant" allows courts to determine flexibly the limits of the merchant class to which each of the Code's

specific merchant burdens applies. The underlying reasons of the merchant sections require a broad reading of that definition and its appli-

cation to persons whose conventional images often do not fit the traditional notion of "merchant." Courts should evaluate the reasonable expectations of the parties in the disputes before them and avoid
a priori categorization that may defeat the purposes of the provision
they are asked to apply.

